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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated im-
pressive performance on a wide array of tasks, but they
are usually considered opaque since internal structure and
learned parameters are not interpretable. In this paper,
we re-examine the internal representations of DNNs using
adversarial images, which are generated by an ensemble-
optimization algorithm. We find that: (1) the neurons
in DNNs do not truly detect semantic objects/parts, but
respond to objects/parts only as recurrent discriminative
patches; (2) deep visual representations are not robust dis-
tributed codes of visual concepts because the representa-
tions of adversarial images are largely not consistent with
those of real images, although they have similar visual ap-
pearance, both of which are different from previous findings.
To further improve the interpretability of DNNs, we propose
an adversarial training scheme with a consistent loss such
that the neurons are endowed with human-interpretable
concepts. The induced interpretable representations enable
us to trace eventual outcomes back to influential neurons.
Therefore, human users can know how the models make pre-
dictions, as well as when and why they make errors.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have demonstrated un-
precedented performance improvements in numerous ap-
plications [15], including speech recognition [19, 25], im-
age classification [13, 28, 30, 9], object detection [6, 23],
etc. Nevertheless, the DNNs are still treated as “black-box”
models due to the lack of understandable decoupled com-
ponents and the unclear working mechanism [3]. In some
cases, the effectiveness of DNNs is limited when the mod-
els are incapable to explain the reasons behind the decisions
or actions to human users, since it is far from enough to pro-
vide eventual outcomes to the users especially in mission-
critical applications, e.g., healthcare or autonomous driving.
The users may also need to understand the rationale of the
decisions such that they can understand, validate, edit, trust
a learned model, and fix the potential problems when it fails
or makes errors. Therefore, it is imperative to develop algo-
rithms to learn features with good interpretability, such that
the users can clearly understand, appropriately trust, and ef-
fectively interact with the models.
Many attempts have been made to address the lack of in-
terpretability issue in DNNs. For example, in [10, 22], a
justification is provided along with a decision, to point out
the visual evidence by a natural sentence. In [34, 26], the
predictions of a model are explained by highlighted image
regions. High-level semantic attributes can be integrated
into DNNs to improve the interpretability explicitly during
the learning process [4]. Moreover, a great amount of ef-
forts have been devoted to visualize and interpret the in-
ternal representations of DNNs [5, 27, 32, 33, 29, 16]. A
neuron in convolutional layers can be interpreted as an ob-
ject/part detector by the activation maximization [5, 33] or
various gradient-based algorithms [32, 27, 29].
However, these methods are performed on specific
datasets (e.g., ImageNet [24], Place [35]), which are not
comprehensively justified in the complex real world. Ad-
ditionally, they are generally conducted to interpret correct
predictions, while few attentions have been paid to investi-
gate why an error has been made. A fault confessed is half
redressed. If we do not know the weaknesses of the model,
we cannot fix its potential problems.
1.1. Our Contributions
There are many aspects of what make a model inter-
pretable to humans. In this paper, we focus on analyz-
ing the behavior of DNNs when facing irregular exam-
ples (i.e., adversarial examples) and explaining the predic-
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Figure 1. The overall framework in this paper. (a) We first generate a set of 500K adversarial images by the ensemble-optimization attack
and re-examine the visual representations with the conclusions of dummy object/part detectors and inconsistent visual representations. (b)
We show that adversarial training facilitates the improvement of the interpretability and consistency of representations in DNNs. (c) The
interpretable representations enable us to trace the eventual predictions back to influential neurons, and explain how the predictions have
been made as well as when and why an error occurs.
tions to human users by tracing outputs back to features.
Specifically, we re-examine previous conclusions about in-
terpretable representations and improve the interpretability
of DNNs by leveraging adversarial examples. With the ma-
liciously generated adversarial examples [31, 8], the DNNs
output attacker-desired (but incorrect) predictions with high
confidence. Adversarial examples along with the real ex-
amples enable us to investigate the behavior of DNNs from
both positive and negative sides, i.e., we can analyze how
DNNs make accurate predictions as well as errors, uncov-
ering the mechanism of DNNs to some extent. We adopt
adversarial images to analyze how DNNs make errors in-
stead of the false predictions of real images because the er-
rors of real images are relatively negligible, e.g., the mis-
classification of tabby cat to tiger cat is more visually and
semantically acceptable than to school bus. Based on the
interpretable DNNs, we then make several steps towards
the interpretability by explaining how the DNNs make deci-
sions, as well as when and why DNNs make mistakes. We
summarize our contributions as follows.
Adversarial dataset. In order to fully ascertain the be-
havior of DNNs, we construct a set of adversarial images.
We generate 10 images with different target labels for each
image in the ILSVRC 2012 [24] validation set, resulting in
an adversarial validation set of size 500K. An ensemble-
optimization attack algorithm is adopted to generate more
general adversarial images, which are less sensitive to a spe-
cific model and have good transferability [17], as is demon-
strated in Fig. 1 (a).
Dummy object/part detectors and inconsistent visual
representations. We re-examine the internal representa-
tions of DNNs by adversarial examples. In the set of our
experiments, we test several standard architectures includ-
ing AlexNet [13], VGG [28] and ResNet [9] using both the
real and the generated adversarial images. We inspect the
response of neurons in DNNs manually and also quantita-
tively evaluate the alignment of visual concepts in selected
real and adversarial images, which activate a given neuron.
Interestingly, we find that: (1) the neurons with high-level1
semantic meanings found by real images do not reveal the
same patterns when showing adversarial images. We con-
clude that neurons in DNNs do not truly detect semantic
objects/parts, but respond to objects/parts only as recurrent
discriminative patches, which is contradictory to previous
findings [33, 2, 7]; (2) we also demonstrate that the overall
representations of adversarial images are inconsistent with
those of the corresponding real images, so the deep visual
representations are not robust distributed codes of visual
concepts, contrary to [1], as is shown in Fig. 1 (a).
Improve the interpretability of DNNs with adversar-
ial training. Adversarial training has proved to be an effec-
tive way to improve the robustness of DNNs [8, 14]. In this
paper, we propose to improve the interpretability of inter-
nal representations by designing an appropriate adversarial
training scheme. By recovering from the adversarial noise,
the representation of an adversarial image resembles that of
the corresponding real image. The procedure encourages
the neurons to learn to resist the interference of adversar-
ial perturbations, and thus the neurons are consistently acti-
vated when the preferred objects/parts appear, while deacti-
vated when they disappear, as shown in Fig. 1 (b). The inter-
pretable representations provide a cue to explain the ratio-
nale of the model’s predictions, i.e., human users can trace
a prediction back to particularly influential neurons in the
decision making procedure. Furthermore, human users can
also know when and why the model makes an error by lever-
aging the interpretable representations, i.e., which group of
1In this paper, we mean the high-level features by objects and parts,
while low-level features include colors and textures, and mid-level features
include attributes (e.g., shiny) and shapes.
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neurons contribute to such a flaw prediction, as shown in
Fig. 1 (c).
2. Re-examine the Internal Representations
It is a popular statement that deep visual representa-
tions have the good transferability since they learn disentan-
gled representations, i.e., some neurons can detect seman-
tic objects/parts spontaneously, and thus form the human-
interpretable representations [33, 32, 2]. In this section, we
criticize this traditional view by showing that the object/part
detectors emerged in DNNs may be easily “fooled” by the
irregular examples (i.e., adversarial examples) in the com-
plex world. There are two possible hypotheses to answer
the following questions “what are the representations of ad-
versarial examples, and why do the representations lead to
inaccurate predictions?”
• The representations of adversarial examples align well
with the semantic objects/parts, but are not discrimi-
native enough, resulting in erroneous predictions.
• The representations of adversarial examples do not
align with the semantic objects/parts, which means by
adding small imperceptible noises, the neurons cannot
detect corresponding objects/parts in adversarial im-
ages, leading to inaccurate predictions.
To examine the “authentic” internal representations of
DNNs when facing adversarial examples, we conduct ex-
periments on the ImageNet dataset [24] for illustration. We
first construct a set of adversarial images by the ensemble-
optimization attack, and then feed them to the models to
figure out the potential problems.
2.1. Ensemble-Optimization Attack
DNNs are shown to be vulnerable against adversarial
perturbations of the input [21]. Several methods have been
proposed to generate adversarial examples such as box-
constrained L-BFGS [31], Fast Gradient Sign [8], Deep-
Fool [20], etc. Since the adversarial examples generated
for a specific model are model-sensitive, we instead gen-
erate them by an ensemble-optimization attack algorithm
following [17]. The generated adversarial images are more
general because different models make the same mistakes,
which are more likely to be misclassified by other unseen
models due to the transferability [17].
Suppose x is a real image with ground-truth class y, and
fθ(x) is a classifier. We seek to generate an adversarial
imagex∗, which adds small imperceptible noise tox but the
classifier will classify x∗ to a target class as fθ(x∗) = y∗
with y∗ 6= y. To fulfill the goal of attack, we solve the
ensemble-optimization problem as
arg min
x∗
λ · d(x,x∗) +
k∑
i=1
`
(
1y∗ , f
(i)
θ (x
∗)
)
, (1)
where d is the L2 distance to quantify the difference be-
tween the real image and its adversarial counterpart, which
guarantees the adversarial samples should be close to the
real ones; 1y∗ is the one-hot encoding of the target class
y∗; f (i)θ is the output of the i-th model; ` is the cross en-
tropy loss to measure the distance between the prediction
and the target; k is the number of ensemble models that
are taken into consideration; and λ is a constant to balance
constraints. We therefore generate an adversarial image be-
longing to the target class y∗ when the optimization prob-
lem reaches its minimum, with its original class denoted as
y.
We attack the ensemble of AlexNet [13], VGG-16 [28]
and ResNet-18 [9] models. For solving the optimization
problem in Eq. (1), we adopt Adam optimizer with step size
5 for 10 ∼ 20 iterations. We generate 10 adversarial images
for each image in the ILSVRC 2012 validation set, with
the 10 least likely classes (least average probability), i.e.,
we choose 10 different y∗, as targets. So we construct an
adversarial validation set of 500K images (See Fig. 1 (a) for
examples).
2.2. Dummy Object/Part Detectors
We first show what a neuron in DNNs truly learns to
detect. For each neuron, we find the top 1% images with
highest activations in the real and adversarial validation sets
respectively (i.e., 500 real images and 5000 adversarial im-
ages) to represent the learned features of that neuron [6, 33],
making the neuron speak for itself.
We show some visualization results in Fig. 2, in which
the highlighted regions are found by discrepancy map [33],
i.e., the given patch is important if there is a large discrep-
ancy and vice versa. As shown in the first row of Fig. 2,
the neurons have explicit explanatory semantic meanings
or human-interpretable concepts when showing real images
only, but the contents of the adversarial images do not align
with the semantic meanings of the corresponding neurons,
if we look at the second row. In general, the neurons tend to
detect nothing in common for adversarial samples.
After investigating the behavior of neurons, we find that
the neurons with high-level semantic meanings with respect
to the real images are also highly activated by the adversar-
ial images (in red boxes) of specific target classes, which
are similar to the corresponding real images. Nevertheless,
the visual appearance is of significant difference between
the real and adversarial images. On the other hand, the ad-
versarial images with contents similar to the meaning of
the neurons have lower activations, indicating the neurons
cannot detect corresponding objects/parts in adversarial im-
ages. For example, the neuron 147 in Fig. 2 (a) detects the
concept bird head in real images, but it fires for adversarial
images with various objects, most of which (in red boxes)
are misclassified as bird due to the adversarial attack. More-
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Figure 2. The real and adversarial images with highest activations for neurons in VGG-16 pool5 layer. The neurons have explicit semantic
meanings in real images, which do not appear in adversarial images. The adversarial images in red boxes have the target classes the same
as the meanings of the neurons (e.g., the model misclassifies the adversarial images in (a) as birds). The highlighted regions are found by
discrepancy map [33]. More visualization results of AlexNet and ResNet-18 can be found in Appendix.
over, it does not fire for adversarial images with real birds,
meaning the neurons do not truly detect bird head in input
images. So we argue that the neurons in DNNs with high-
level concepts do not actually detect semantic objects/parts
in input images, but they only tend to respond to discrimi-
native patches with the corresponding output classes.
2.2.1 Quantification of Features
To further verify our argument, we quantitatively analyze
the behavior of neurons by first proposing a metric to quan-
tify the level and the consistency of the features learned
by each neuron, and then measuring the similarity of vi-
sual concepts in real and adversarial images. Considering
of the intuitive observations, low-level concepts (such as
colors, textures, etc) can occur in a broad range of images
with diverse classes, while high-level concepts (such as ob-
jects, parts) only appear in several specific classes. It is
easy to conclude that a neuron tends to consistently detect
high-level semantic concepts (i.e., objects/parts) if its re-
sponse concentrates on some specific classes, and otherwise
spreads across a wide range of classes. Due to these obser-
vations, we propose a metric to measure the level and the
consistency of the features learned by each neuron.
Given a set of real images with highest activations (i.e.,
top 1%) for a neuron ni, we extract a categorical distribution
pi to indicate which class it prefers, where p
j
i is the fraction
of images with ground-truth label j. It is noted that entropy
of pi, which is a natural choice to be the metric, fails to
explore the hierarchical correlation between classes. As an
example in Fig. 3, a neuron that responds to different types
of dogs detects a higher level of human-interpretable con-
cepts (e.g., dog face) than another neuron which responds
to both cats and dogs (e.g., animal fur). To address this is-
sue, we quantify the features learned by each neuron based
on WordNet [18], which groups different classes by means
of their conceptual-semantic and lexical relations.
Domestic Animal
Cat Dog
Persian
 Cat
Tabby 
Cat
Kitty
Cat
Garfield 
Cat Samoyed Wolfhound Collie Whippet Spitz
Figure 3. Illustration for quantifying the level and the consistency
of features on WordNet. The red path indicates the distance be-
tween persian cat and wolfhound d = 4, which is larger than the
distance between tabby cat and kitty cat (d = 2 indicated by the
green path).
As is demonstrated in Fig. 3, we measure the distance be-
tween different classes on the WordNet tree, e.g., the green
path indicates d = 2 for tabby cat and kitty cat, and the
red path implies a large distance d = 4 between persian
cat and wolfhound. As the distance in the WordNet tree
is an appropriate measurement for semantic similarity be-
tween words [12], we thus define the correlation between
the corresponding classes as
ci,j = exp
(
−d
2(wi, wj)
2σ2
)
, (2)
where wi, wj are the words of the i, j-th classes, d(wi, wj)
is their WordNet tree distance, and σ is a hyper-parameter
to control the decaying rate, which is set to 1 in experi-
ments. We form the distance matrix by collecting each pair
of the corresponding classes as C = [ci,j ]. The level and
the consistency of the features learned by the neuron ni is
quantified as the semantic distance
LC(ni) = ‖pi‖2C = pTi Cpi. (3)
A higher score implies that the neuron consistently detects
a higher level semantic concept, or concentrates on more
4
specific categories. Note that we do not specify the true
meanings for the neurons like [2] but only measure the level
and the consistency of their features, to fulfill the studies in
the following sections. The proposed metric correlates well
with human judgment, which is discussed in Appendix.
2.2.2 Quantitative Results
In this section, we investigate the alignment of the detected
concepts by considering the real and adversarial images
with highest activations for a neuron (i.e., top 1%). Specif-
ically, we denote the categorical distribution corresponding
to a given neuron as p for the top 1% real images; further-
more, we have two categorical distributions for the top 1%
adversarial images as q and q˜, which are the distributions
for their original classes and target classes.
Similar as the LC metric in Eq. (3), we calculate the co-
sine similarity between the real and adversarial images as
CS1 =
〈p, q〉C
‖p‖C · ‖q‖C =
pTCq√
pTCp
√
qTCq
, (4)
CS2 =
〈p, q˜〉C
‖p‖C · ‖q˜‖C =
pTCq˜√
pTCp
√
q˜TCq˜
, (5)
where CS1 measures the similarity of contents between the
real and adversarial images for a neuron; and CS2 is corre-
sponding to the similarity of the predicted classes between
them. As an extreme case, CS1 = 1 means that the origi-
nal classes of adversarial images are the same as the classes
of real images, meaning the same contents. On the other
hand, CS2 = 1 indicates that the target classes of adversar-
ial images are the same as the real ones without regarding
the true contents. Note that CS1 and CS2 cannot be high at
the same time, because q and q˜ are of great difference due
to the attack.
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Figure 4. Cosine similarity between the classes of real and adver-
sarial images for neurons against the level and the consistency of
their features. We average the CS1 and CS2 of different neurons
around a given LC value. The neurons come from all convolu-
tional layers in each model.
The results of the cosine similarity against each neuron’s
LC score (derived by Eq. (3) with the categorical distribu-
tion p of real images) is shown in Fig. 4. With the neu-
rons’ LC score increasing, CS1 decreases which means the
neurons with respect to high-level semantic concepts do not
respond to the true contents in images; nevertheless, CS2
increases which implies that the neurons respond to similar
classes although the visual inputs are not relevant. This ob-
servation indicates that the neurons with higher level mean-
ings tend to respond to images of specific classes but not
the true contents of images. It supports our argument that
the neurons with high-level semantic meanings do not de-
tect objects/parts in input images, but they only respond to
discriminative patches with respect to the preferred outputs,
which agrees with the second hypothesis at the beginning
of this section.
2.3. Inconsistent Deep Visual Representations
We further analyze the behavior of the overall visual rep-
resentations. For each adversarial image x∗ with its original
class y and target class y∗, we first retrieve the real images
in the ILSVRC 2012 validation set of class y and y∗ as {x}y
and {x}y∗ , respectively. We then calculate the ratios of the
average Euclidean distance between the representations as
r1 =
d¯(φ(x∗), {φ(x)}y)
d¯({φ(x)}y, {φ(x)}y)
, (6)
r2 =
d¯(φ(x∗), {φ(x)}y∗)
d¯({φ(x)}y, {φ(x)}y∗)
, (7)
where d¯ measures the average pairwise Euclidean distance
of points and φ is the feature representation of an image in
the last convolutional layer of a specific model. r1 indicates
whether the representation of an adversarial image is away
from the real image representations of its original class and
r2 measures how much is the representation close to those
of its target class. The denominators in r1 and r2 act as nor-
malization terms to make a consistent representation have
mean 1.
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Figure 5. The distribution of adversarial images against the ratio
of distance. The vertical axis shows the number of adversarial
images around a given ratio. The average r1 of AlexNet, VGG-16
and ResNet-18 are 1.07, 1.26 and 1.34 for all adversarial images
while the average r2 of them are 0.80, 0.73 and 0.76, respectively.
We show the number of adversarial images around a
given ratio in Fig. 5. A large number of adversarial images
have r1 lager than 1, which proves that the representation of
an adversarial image is far from the representations of the
real images with its original class. Moreover, great majority
of adversarial images have much smaller r2 than 1, indicat-
ing that the representation of an adversarial image is closer
5
to those of its target class than the average distance between
these two classes.
From the results, we conclude that the overall visual
representations of adversarial images are inconsistent with
those of real images. That means, the representations are
greatly affected by adversarial perturbations and they are
not robust distributed codes of visual concepts. One conse-
quence of this fact is that the representations will also lead
to inaccurate predictions for other transferred tasks like ob-
ject detection, visual question answering, video processing,
etc. So the effectiveness of visual representations is limited
by their inconsistency between adversarial images and real
images.
2.4. When Do DNNs Make Errors?
The inconsistent feature representations provide us an
opportunity to tell when the DNNs make errors. The rep-
resentations of adversarial images do not resemble those of
real images, which can be detected as outliers. We esti-
mate the probability distribution of visual representations
by a conditional Gaussian distribution as p(φ(x)|y = i) =
N (µi,Σi), where y is the ground-truth label of x and
i = 1, ..., 1000 with 1000 being the number of classes. We
learn {µi,Σi} on the ILSVRC 2012 training set with im-
ages of class i and estimate the log-probability of represen-
tations on real and adversarial validation sets conditioned
on the predictions yˆ, where yˆ = arg max fθ(x) with fθ(x)
being the prediction of a DNN.
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Figure 6. ROC curve for adversarial perturbation detection.
We show the detection ROC curve in Fig. 6. The AUC is
0.817, 0.847 and 0.926 for AlexNet, VGG-16 and ResNet-
18, respectively. It shows that we can effectively detect ad-
versarial images due to the inconsistency between the rep-
resentations of real and adversarial images. This procedure
enables us to tell when the models make mistakes, but it is
insufficient to tell why they make mistakes. After improv-
ing the interpretability of DNNs by adversarial training, we
can answer when and why DNNs make mistakes in Sec. 4.
3. Adversarial Training
The neurons that act as dummy object/part detectors and
the visual representations that are inconsistent between real
and adversarial images make the interpretability unreliable
in DNNs. In this section, we propose to improve the in-
terpretability of DNNs with adversarial training. Unlike
other methods that use high-level semantic attributes to im-
prove the interpretability of DNNs explicitly [4], we train
the DNNs towards interpretability implicitly. Adversarial
training has the potential to train interpretable DNNs be-
cause it makes the models learn more robust concepts in
input space, yielding the representations of adversarial im-
ages resemble those of the original images by suppressing
the perturbations. To achieve that, we introduce a consis-
tent (feature matching) loss in adversarial training because
that the supervision in output can only make the input-
output mapping smoother, while not guarantee the input-
representation mapping smoother. The consistent loss term
aims to recover from the adversarial noises in representa-
tions, which makes the neurons consistently activate when
the preferred objects/parts appear without the interference
of adversarial noises.
We train the DNNs by minimizing an adversarial objec-
tive as
L(x, y, θ) = α`(1y, fθ(x))
+ (1− α)`(1y, fθ(G(x, y∗)))
+ β‖φθ(x)− φθ(G(x, y∗))‖22,
(8)
where ` is the cross entropy loss; G(x, y∗) is the genera-
tive process for adversarial images with target class y∗; and
α, β are two balanced weights for these three loss terms.
The last loss term is the consistent loss, which is the L2 dis-
tance between the representations of a pair of real and ad-
versarial images in the last convolutional layer. By solving
the problem, we improve the interpretability of represen-
tations in terms of both positive and negative aspects, i.e.,
the learning process encourages the neurons to consistently
activate when the preferred objects/parts appear, while de-
activate when they disappear.
We use a variant of Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) method [8]
to generate adversarial image as
x∗0 = x, (9)
x∗t = clip(x
∗
t−1 −  · sign∇x`(1y∗ , fθ(x∗t−1))), (10)
G(x, y∗) = x∗T . (11)
where clip(x) is used to clip each dimension of x to the
range of pixel values, i.e., [0, 255]. In experiments, we fine-
tune the AlexNet, VGG-16 and ResNet-18 by Eq. (8) with
α = 0.5, β = 0.1 and T = 10 on ILSVRC 2012 training
set. After training, we test the new models with the real
and adversarial images in the validation set to examine the
visual representations again.
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Figure 7. The real and adversarial images with highest activations for neurons in VGG-16 pool5 layer after adversarial training. The visual
concepts in both of them are quite similar. More visualization results of AlexNet and ResNet-18 are provided in Appendix.
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Figure 8. Cosine similarity between the classes of real and ad-
versarial images for neurons against the level and the consistency
of their features after adversarial training. CS1 remains high and
CS2 remains low when the LC score increases, which proves the
neurons learn more robust concepts.
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Figure 9. The distribution of adversarial images with respect to
the ratio of distances after adversarial training. The average r1 of
AlexNet, VGG-16 and ResNet-18 are 0.98, 0.99 and 0.98 for all
adversarial images while the average r2 of them are 0.90, 0.92,
0.87 , respectively.
We find that the interpretability is largely improved with
little performance degeneration (1% ∼ 4% accuracy drop,
more details on performance are provided in Appendix).
The top images in both sets with highest activations are
shown in Fig. 7. The visual concepts are quite similar in
them compared with Fig. 2, indicating that the neurons are
more likely to respond to true objects/parts.
Quantitative results also prove that shown in Fig. 8. The
high correlation between p and q indicates that the neurons
respond to true contents in images, but not the images of
the corresponding classes, yielding a more interpretable and
robust representation associating with the authentic input
contents.
To examine the overall visual representations, we show
the ratios r1 and r2 of distance between representations in
Fig. 9. The overall representations are much closer to the
representations of their original classes and farther from
those of their target classes, compared with Fig. 5. It can
be concluded that adversarial training with a consistent loss
makes the overall representations more consistent between
real images and adversarial images.
4. Towards Interpretable DNNs
After adversarial training, the neurons can detect vi-
sual concepts in images, but not respond to discriminative
patches only. One advantage of the interpretable represen-
tations is that they provide a cue to explain why the predic-
tions have been made. We can trace an eventual prediction
back to its representation space and figure out a set of in-
fluential neurons in the decision making process. Here we
introduce a variant of prediction difference methods [4, 36]
based on the hierarchical class correlation and semantic dis-
tance to retrieve a set of important neurons for a single pre-
diction.
Formally, assume a model fθ(x) is decoupled into a fea-
ture extraction module and a prediction module as g(φ(x)),
where φ(x) is the feature representation of x. We aim to
identify a set of influential neurons in φ(x), so we measure
the relevance of each neuron i with respect to the output by
the prediction difference as
PD(φ(x)i) = ‖g(φ(x))− g(φ(x)\i)‖2C, (12)
where φ(x)\i denotes the set of all features except i, and
the distance is measured by ‖v‖2C = vTCv. Larger
PD(φ(x)i) means a more influential neuron i. For each
prediction, we retrieve a set of neurons with PD larger than
a threshold.
We show some examples in Fig. 10. For each image,
top-2 influential neurons with highest PD values are traced
back and we visualize learned features of each neuron. For
real images, the visual concepts of the retrieved neurons can
well explain the reasons of the current predictions.
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Figure 10. Demonstration for tracing the predictions back to neurons. We take VGG-16 for example with the neurons from pool5 layer.
The neurons as well as their learned features can well explain the visual evidence for the predictions. The procedure also enables us to
detect adversarial images manually due to the inconsistent visual evidences.
For an adversarial image, the visual concepts of the re-
trieved neurons are not consistent, and some particular vi-
sual evidences are not likely to occur in the predicted class.
The neurons that detect the true visual objects in the in-
put images will result in large prediction difference when
removing them, because the predicted probability will be
greatly affected by losing object/part detectors for the true
concepts (e.g., the probability for the inaccurate class may
be larger). On the other hand, the neurons that detect the
concepts of its target class will also lead to large prediction
difference, because they contribute to such a flaw, and the
prediction may be corrected by removing them. The con-
cepts of these neurons are contradictory in some cases. Take
Fig. 10 (b) for example, the adversarial image “bulbul” is
misclassified to “moving van”, but the retrieved neurons
reveal the feature “bird”, which is weird in real “moving
van” images, so we can deduce that it is an adversarial im-
age. This process enables users to know when and why the
model makes an error and makes them trust the model.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we re-examine the internal representations
of DNNs and obtain two conclusions which are contradic-
tory to previous findings. First, the neurons in DNNs do not
truly detect objects/parts in input images, but they respond
to objects/parts as recurrent discriminative patches. Second,
the visual representations are not robust distributed codes
of visual concepts, which limits their effectiveness when
transferred to other tasks. To improve the interpretability of
DNNs, we propose an adversarial training algorithm with a
consistent loss. Results show that the neurons learn more
robust concepts and the representations are more consis-
tent between real and adversarial images. Moreover, human
users can know how the models make predictions as well
as when and why they make errors by leveraging the inter-
pretable representations.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we provide more details in our experi-
ments. In Sec. A, we show the performance of the adopted
DNN models (i.e., AlexNet, VGG-16 and ResNet-18) be-
fore and after adversarial training on the real and generated
adversarial ImageNet validation sets. We also show that the
models after adversarial training are more robust than origi-
nal models. In Sec. B, we show the effectiveness of the pro-
posed LC metric to quantify the level and the consistency
of the features learned by each neuron through human judg-
ment. In Sec. C, we provide more visualization results of
AlexNet and ResNet-18, supplementing Fig. 2 and Fig. 7 in
the main body of this paper.
A. Model Details
We use the pre-trained AlexNet [13], VGG-16 [28] from
Caffe [11] model zoo2 and train the ResNet-18 [9] model
from scratch. The ResNet-18 network is trained with SGD
solver with momentum 0.9, weight decay 5 × 10−5 and
batch size 100. The learning rate starts from 0.05 and is
divided by 10 when the error plateaus. We train it for 300K
iterations.
We denote the new models after adversarial training
as “AlexNet-Adv”, “VGG-16-Adv” and “ResNet-18-Adv”,
respectively. We also denote the real ImageNet valida-
tion set as “Valid” and the generated adversarial dataset as
“Valid-Adv”.
Model Dataset top-1 top-5
AlexNet Valid 54.53 78.17
VGG-16 Valid 68.20 88.33
ResNet-18 Valid 66.38 87.13
AlexNet-Adv Valid 49.89 74.28
VGG-16-Adv Valid 62.81 84.61
Res-18-Adv Valid 64.24 85.75
AlexNet Valid-Adv 0.32 3.41
VGG-16 Valid-Adv 0.32 10.72
ResNet-18 Valid-Adv 0.02 20.35
AlexNet-Adv Valid-Adv 41.37 65.42
VGG-16-Adv Valid-Adv 45.74 71.20
ResNet-18-Adv Valid-Adv 46.42 71.48
Table 1. Accuracy (%) on ImageNet
We report the performance of these models in Table 1 on
both real validation set and adversarial validation set, and
all the results are reported with only single center crop test-
ing. We notice that after adversarial training, the accuracies
on the real validation set drop 3.89%, 3.72% and 1.38% for
AlexNet, VGG-16 and ResNet-18, respectively (in the term
of top-5 accuracy). But the accuracies on the adversarial set
2https://github.com/BVLC/caffe/wiki/Model-Zoo
are largely increased (i.e., 62.01%, 60.48% and 51.13% for
AlexNet, VGG-16 and ResNet-18, respectively). We argue
that the adversarial training is a trade-off between models’
performance and their interpretability as well as the robust-
ness.
In order to further prove the robustness of the models
after adversarial training, we conduct experiments to eval-
uate their performance against adversarial perturbations by
Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) method [8]. FGS constructs ad-
versarial images by moving the vector representation of an
image along a particular direction defined by the sign of the
gradient, which can be formulated as
x∗ = clip(x+  · sign(∇x`(1y, fθ(x)))), (13)
where y is the ground-truth label of an image x. We test
AlexNet, VGG-16, ResNet-18 and their corresponding ver-
sions after adversarial training (i.e., AlexNet-Adv, VGG-
16-Adv and ResNet-18-Adv) against FGS attack with  = 1
and  = 5 on ImageNet validation set.
Model  = 1  = 5top-1 top-5 top-1 top5
AlexNet 9.04 32.77 0.41 5.86
AlexNet-Adv 21.16 49.34 3.84 20.43
VGG-16 15.13 39.82 1.95 14.96
VGG-16-Adv 47.67 71.23 10.17 39.18
ResNet-18 4.38 31.66 0.59 9.37
ResNet-18-Adv 20.67 51.00 3.63 22.41
Table 2. Accuracy (%) on ImageNet validation set against FGS
attack
Table 2 summarizes the results. The new models af-
ter adversarial training can largely improve the accuracy
against attacks. We show that our adversarial training
scheme with a consistent loss can also improve the ro-
bustness of DNNs, which agrees with previous conclu-
sions [31, 8].
B. Evaluation of the LC Metric
We evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed LC met-
ric defined in Sec. 2.2.1 by human judgment. We choose
VGG-16 model for evaluation. In experiments, we ask 5
volunteers to judge the level and the consistency of the fea-
tured learned by neurons. Each volunteer was asked to com-
pare two neurons, each one of which is represented by 9
images with highest activations. Each image is also shown
with highlighted regions found by discrepancy map [33].
We random select 2000 pairs of neurons in VGG-16 and
show the corresponding images for each volunteer, who was
asked to answer which one of the two neurons consistently
represents a higher level of concepts, as shown in Fig. 11.
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Figure 11. We show 9 images with highest activations of two neu-
rons for each volunteer, who was asked to answer which one rep-
resents a higher level of concepts consistently. Humans can easily
identify that the left neuron detects bird while the right neuron de-
tects yellow objects, so the left neuron detects a higher level con-
cept. It agrees with the LC metric, which scores the left neuron
0.17 and the right neuron 0.05. Note that we do not show the LC
score during human judgment.
The volunteers were not aware of the definition of the met-
ric as well as our purpose.
We also compare the LC metric of these pairs of neu-
rons, i.e., a higher score indicates a higher level concept. We
measure the agreements of the results found by our methods
and human judgments. The consistency between our met-
ric and each volunteer is 83.65%, 85.75%, 86.6%, 88.6%
and 86.95%. It proves that our proposed metric is effective
to measure the level and the consistency of each neuron’s
features.
C. Visualization Results
We show supplementary visualization results in Fig. 12
and Fig. 13. The dummy object/part detectors also emerge
in AlexNet and ResNet-18, which is the same as VGG-16 ,
as we show in Fig. 2 in the main body of the paper.
After adversarial training, the neurons learn to resist ad-
versarial perturbations and respond to true objects/parts. We
also show the visualization results of AlexNet and ResNet-
18 after adversarial training in Fig. 14 and Fig. 15. The
results are consistent with those in Fig. 7 in the main body
of the paper.
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(b) Neuron 91: Dog(a) Neuron 41: Bird (c) Neuron 61: Car Wheel (d) Neuron 145: Human Face
Figure 12. The real and adversarial images with highest activations for neurons in AlexNet pool5 layer. Supplementary visualization results
of Fig. 2 in the main body of the paper.
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(a) Neuron 89: Bird (b) Neuron 61: Bus (c) Neuron 7: Triumphal Arch (d) Neuron 159: Dog
Figure 13. The real and adversarial images with highest activations for neurons in ResNet-18 conv5b layer. Supplementary visualization
results of Fig. 2 in the main body of the paper.
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(b) Neuron 91: Dog(a) Neuron 68: Bird (c) Neuron 86: Car Wheel (d) Neuron 161: Human Face
Figure 14. The real and adversarial images with highest activations for neurons in AlexNet pool5 layer after adversarial training. Supple-
mentary visualization results of Fig. 7 in the main body of the paper.
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(a) Neuron 19: Bird (b) Neuron 61: Bus (c) Neuron 207: House (d) Neuron 153: Dog
Figure 15. The real and adversarial images with highest activations for neurons in ResNet-18 conv5b layer after adversarial training.
Supplementary visualization results of Fig. 7 in the main body of the paper.
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